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Abstract
This paper aims to provide a mathematically tractable background
against which to model both modal cognitivism and modal expressivism.
I argue that epistemic modal algebras comprise a materially adequate
fragment of the language of thought. I demonstrate, then, how modal
expressivism can be regimented by modal coalgebraic automata, to which
the above epistemic modal algebras are dually isomorphic. I examine,
in particular, the virtues unique to the modal expressivist approach here
proffered in the setting of the foundations of mathematics, by contrast
to competing approaches based upon both the inferentialist approach to
concept-individuation and the codification of speech acts via intensional
semantics.
1 Introduction
This essay endeavors to reconcile two approaches to the intensional foundations
of thought: modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. The novel contribution
of the paper is its argument for a reconciliation between the two positions, by
providing a hybrid account in which both internal cognitive architecture, on the
model of epistemic possibilities, as well as modal automata, are accommodated,
while retaining what is supposed to be their unique and inconsistent roles.
Modal cognitivism is the proposal that the internal representations compris-
ing the language of thought can be modeled via a possible world semantics.
Modal expressivism has, in turn, been delineated in two ways. On the first ap-
proach, the presuppositions shared by a community of speakers have been mod-
eled as circumstantial possibilities (cf. Kratzer, 1979; Stalnaker, 1978, 1984).
Speech acts have in turn been modeled as modal operators, the semantic values
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of which are then defined relative to an array of intensional parameters (Stal-
naker, op. cit.; Veltman, 1996; Yalcin, 2007). On the second approach, the
content of concepts is supposed to be individuated via the ability to draw infer-
ences, and the pragmatic abilities of individuals have been modeled as automata
comprised of two transition functions. A counterfactual transition functional –
encoding the recognition of distal properties – determines the range of admis-
sible values for another transition function encoding the individual’s actions
(cf. Brandom, 2008). Inferential conditions constitutive of concept possession
are then taken to have the same counterfactual form as the foregoing functions
(Brandom, 2014), while truth-evaluable descriptions of the automata are spec-
ified in a metalanguage (Brandom, 2008). Both the modal approach to shared
information and the speech acts which serve to update the latter, and the modal-
inferential approach to concept-individuation – are thus consistent with mental
states having semantic values or truth-conditional characterizations.1
So defined, the modal cognitivist and modal expressivist approaches have
been assumed to be in constitutive opposition. While the cognitivist proposal
avails of modal resources in order to model the internal representations com-
prising an abstract language of thought, the expressivist proposal targets infor-
mational properties which extend beyond the remit of internal cognitive archi-
tecture: both the form and the parameters relevant to determining the semantic
1The notions of cognitivism and expressivism here targeted concern the role of internal –
rather than external – factors in countenancing the nature of thought and information (cf.
Fodor, 1975; Haugeland, 1978). Possible worlds semantics is taken then to provide the most
descriptively adequate means of countenancing the structure of the foregoing. Delineating
cognitivism and expressivism by whether the positions avail of internal representations is thus
orthogonal to the eponymous dispute between realists and antirealists with regard to whether
mental states are truth-apt, i.e., have a representational function, rather than being non-
representational and non-factive, even if real (cf. Dummett, 1959; Blackburn, 1984; Price,
2013). Whereas the type of modal cognitivism examined here assumes that thoughts and
information take exclusively the form of internal representations, the target modal expressivist
proposals assume that information states are exhaustively individuated by both linguistic
behavior and conditions external to the cognitive architecture of agents.
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values of linguistic utterances, where the informational common ground is taken
to be reducible to circumstantial possibilities; and the individuation of the con-
tents of concepts on the basis of inferential behavior.
In this paper, I provide a background mathematical theory, in order to ac-
count for the reconciliation of the cognitivist and expressivist proposals. I avail,
in particular, of the dual isomorphism between Boolean-valued models of epis-
temic modal algebras and coalgebras; i.e., labeled transition systems defined
in the setting of category theory.2 The functors of coalgebras permit of flexi-
ble interpretations, such that they are able to characterize both modal logics
as well as discrete-state automata. I argue that the correspondence between
epistemic modal algebras and modal coalgebraic automata is sufficient then for
the provision of a mathematically tractable, modal foundation for thought and
action.
In Section 2, I provide the background mathematical theory, in order to
account for the reconciliation of the cognitivist and expressivist proposals.
In Section 3, I provide reasons adducing in favor of modal cognitivism, and
argue for the material adequacy of epistemic modal algebras as a fragment of
the language of thought. I outline, further, an expressivist semantics for epis-
temic modals, and provide a reason to prefer expressivist semantics to relativist
semantics. The proposal that possible worlds semantics comprises the model
for thoughts and propositions is anticipated by Wittgenstein (1921/1974: 2.15-
2.151, 3-3.02); Chalmers (2011); and Jackson (2011). Their approaches depart,
however, from the one here examined in the following respects.
2For an algebraic characterization of dynamic-epistemic logic, see Kurz and Palmigiano
(2013). Baltag (2003) develops a colagebraic semantics for dynamic-epistemic logic, where
coalgebraic functors are intended to record the informational dynamics of single- and multi-
agent systems. The current approach differs from the foregoing by examining the dual isomor-
phism between static epistemic modal algebras and coalgebraic automata, where the functors
in the latter are interpreted as expressive of the epistemic states comprising the modal alge-
bras.
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Wittgenstein (op. cit.: 1-1.1) has been interpreted as endorsing an identity
theory of propositions, which does not distinguish between internal thoughts
and external propositions (cf. McDowell, 1994: 27; and Hornsby, 1997: 1-3).
How the identity theory of propositions is able to accommodate Wittgenstein’s
suggestion that a typed hierarchy of propositions can be generated – only if
the class of propositions has a general form and the sense of propositions over
which operations range is invariant by being individuated by the possibilities
figuring as their truth and falsity conditions (cf. Wittgenstein, 1979: 21/11/16,
23/11/16, 7/11/17; and Potter, 2009: 283-285 for detailed discussion) – is an
open question. Wittgenstein (1921/1974: 5.5561) writes that ’Hierarchies are
and must be independent of reality’, although provides no account of how the
independence can be effected.
Jackson (2008: 48-50) distinguishes between personal and subpersonal the-
ories by the role of neural science in individuating representational states (cf.
Shea, 2013, for further discussion), and argues in favor of a ’personal-level im-
plicit theory’ for the possible worlds semantics of mental representations.
Chalmers’ approach comes closest to the one here proffered, because he ar-
gues for a hybrid cognitivist-expressivist approach as well, according to which
epistemic intensions – i.e. functions from epistemically possible worlds to ex-
tensions – are individuated by their inferential roles (2012: 462-463). Chalmers
(2012: 463, 466) endorses what he refers to as "anchored inferentialism", and in
particular "acquaintance inferentialism" for intensions, according to which "there
is a limited set of primitive concepts, and all other concepts are grounded in their
inferential role with respect to these concepts", where "the primitive concepts
are acquaintance concepts" (op. cit.) and "[a]cquaintance concepts may include
phenomenal concepts and observational concepts: primitive concepts of phe-
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nomenal properties, spatiotemporal properties, and secondary qualities" (2010:
11). According to Chalmers, "anchored inferential role determines a primary
intension. The relevant role can be seen as an internal (narrow or short-armed)
role, so that the content is a narrow content" (2010: 5). The inferences in
question are taken to be "suppositional" inferences, from a base class of truths,
PQTI – i.e. truths about physics, consciousness, and indexicality, and a that’s
all truth – determining canonical specifications of epistemically possible worlds,
to other truths. With regard to how suppositional inference, i.e. "scrutability",
plays a role in the definitions of intensions, Chalmers writes that "[t]he primary
intension of [a sentence] S is true at a scenario [i.e. epistemically possible world]
w iff D epistemically necessitates S, where D is a canonical specification of w",
where "D epistemically necessitates S iff a conditional of the form ’D → S’ is
apriori" and the apriori entailment is the relation of scrutability (2006)."The
secondary intension of S is true at a world w iff D metaphysically necessitates
S", where "D metaphysically necessitates S when a subjunctive conditional of
the form ’if D had been the case, S would have been the case’ is true" (op.
cit.). Thus, suppositional inference, i.e. scrutability, determines the intensions
of two-dimensional semantics.
On my approach, intensions are semantically imbued functions. Intensions
as functions comprise the computational syntax for the Language of Thought,
but they are semantically imbued because they are functions from epistemic
possibilities to extensions. This is consistent with the inferences of scrutability
playing a role in the individuation of intensions, but whereas Chalmers grounds
inferences in dispositions (2010: 10), I claim that the inferences drawn from the
canonical specifications of epistemic possibilities to arbitrary truths are apriori
mental computations.
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Modal coalgebraic automata are argued, finally, to be preferred as models of
modal expressivism, by contrast to the speech-act and inferentialist approaches,
in virtue of the advantages accruing to the model in the philosophy of mathemat-
ics. The interest in modal coalgebraic automata consists, in particular, in the
range of mathematical properties that can be recovered on the basis thereof.3 By
contrast to the above competing approaches to modal expressivism, the functors
of modal coalgebraic automata are able both to model and explain elementary
embeddings in the category of sets; the intensions of mathematical terms; as
well as the modal profile of Ω-logical consequence.
Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
2 The Hybrid Proposal
2.1 Epistemic Modal Algebra
In Epistemic Modal Algebra, a topological Boolean algebra, A, can be formed
by taking the powerset of a topological space, X; A = P(X). The domain of A
is comprised of formula-terms – eliding propositions with names – assigned to
elements of P(X), where the formula-terms encode epistemic possibilities; i.e.,
possibilities defined relative to states of information. The top element of the
algebra is denoted ’1’ and the bottom element is denoted ’0’. We interpret the
modal operators, f(x), – i.e., monotonic intensional functions in the algebra – as
both equivalent to concepts, as well as countenancing the property of topological
interiority. An Epistemic Modal-valued Algebraic structure has the form, F =
〈A, DP (X), ρ〉, where ρ is a mapping from points in the topological space to
elements or regions of the algebraic structure; i.e., ρ : DP (X) x DP (X) → A. A
3See Wittgenstein (2001: IV, 4-6, 11, 30-31), for a prescient expressivist approach to the
modal profile of mathematical formulas.
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model over the Epistemic-Modal Topological Boolean Algebraic structure has
the form M = 〈F, V〉, where V(a) ≤ ρ(a) and V(a,b) ∧ ρ(a, b) ≤ V(b).4 For all
xx/a,φ,y∈A:
f(1) = 1;
f(x) ≤ x;
f(x ∧ y) = f(x) ∧ f(y);
f[f(x)] = f(x);
V(a, a) > 0;
V(a, a) = 1;
V(a, b) = V(b, a);
V(a, b) ∧ V(b, c) ≤ V(a, c);
V(a = a) = ρ(a, a);
V(a, b) ≤ f[V(a, b)];
V(¬φ) = ρ(¬φ) – f(φ);
V(⋄φ) = ρφ – f[– V(φ)];
V(φ) = f[V(φ)] (cf. Lando, op. cit.).
Availing of the epistemic interpretation of two-dimensional intensional se-
mantics, epistemic possibilities can be defined thus:
• Epistemic (1-)Necessity (Apriority):
JφKv,w = 1 ⇐⇒ ∀v′JφKv,v
′
= 1
(φ is true at all points in epistemic modal space).
• Epistemic Possibility
J⋄vφKiv 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ JPrφKiv 6= ∅ ∧ >.5, else 〈∅, Priv (φ | ∅)〉, where iv
designates an agent’s state of information in a context.
4See Lando (2015); McKinsey and Tarski (1944); and Rasiowa (1963), for further details.
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(φ might be true if and only if its value is not null and it is greater than
.5).
• Metaphysical (2-)Necessity:
JφKv,w = 1 ⇐⇒ ∀w′JφKv,w
′
= 1
(φ is true at all points in metaphysical modal space).
• Super-rigidity (2D-Intension):
mat(φ) = JφKv,w = 1 ⇐⇒ JφKv
′,w′ = 1
(the intension of φ is rigid in all points in epistemic and metaphysical
modal space).
• Modally Factive Apriority:
!(φ) = ∀v′JφKv
′,v′ = 1 ∧ ∃w′JφKw,w
′
= 1
(φ is true at all points in epistemic modal space, and is further true at one
metaphysically possible world).
An abstraction principle for epistemic intensions can be defined as follows:
For all types, A,B, there is a homotopy:
H := [(f ∼ g) :≡
∏
x:A(f(x) = g(x)], where
∏
f :A→B[(f ∼ f) ∧ (f ∼ g → g ∼ f) ∧ (f ∼ g → g ∼ h → f ∼ h)],
such that, via Voevodsky’s (2006) Univalence Axiom, for all type families
A,B:U, there is a function:
idtoeqv : (A =U B) → (A ≃ B),
which is itself an equivalence relation:
(A =U B) ≃ (A ≃ B).
Abstraction principles for intensional computational properties take, then,
the form:
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• ∃f,g[f(x) = g(x)] ≃ [f(x) ≃ g(x)].
2.2 Modal Coalgebraic Automata
Modal coalgebraic automata can be thus characterized. Let a category C be
comprised of a class Ob(C) of objects and a family of arrows for each pair of
objects C(A,B) (Venema, 2007: 421). A functor from a category C to a category
D, E: C → D, is an operation mapping objects and arrows of C to objects and
arrows of D (422). An endofunctor on C is a functor, E: C → C (op. cit.).
A E-coalgebra is a pair A = (A, µ), with A an object of C referred to as the
carrier of A, and µ: A → E(A) is an arrow in C, referred to as the transition
map of A (390).
As, further, a coalgebraic model of modal logic, A can be defined as follows
(407):
For a set of formulas, Φ, let ∇Φ := 
∨
Φ ∧
∧
⋄Φ, where ⋄Φ denotes the
set {⋄φ | φ∈Φ} (op. cit.). Then,
⋄φ ≡ ∇{φ, T},
φ ≡ ∇∅ ∨ ∇φ (op. cit.).
Let, then, an E-coalgebraic modal model, A = 〈S,λ,R[.]〉, be such that S,s 
∇Φ if and only if, for all (some) successors σ of s∈S, [Φ,σ(s)∈E(A)] (op. cit.).
A coalgebraic model of deterministic automata can finally be thus defined
(391). An automaton is a tuple, A = 〈A, aI , C, δ, F〉, such that A is the state
space of the automaton A; aI∈A is the automaton’s initial state; C is the coding
for the automaton’s alphabet, mapping numerals to properties of the natural
numbers; δ: A X C → A is a transition function, and F⊆ A is the collection of
admissible states, where F maps A to {1,0}, such that F: A → 1 if a∈F and A
→ 0 if a/∈F (op. cit.).
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The crux of the reconciliation between algebraic models of cognitivism and
the formal foundations of modal expressivism is based on the dual isomorphism
between categories of algebras and coalgebras: A = 〈A, α:A → E(A)〉 is dually
isomorphic to the category of algebras over the functor α (417-418). For a
category C, object A, and endofunctor E, define a new arrow, α, s.t. α:EA →
A. A homomorphism, f , can further be defined between algebras 〈A, α〉, and
〈B, β〉. Then, for the category of algebras, the following commutative square
can be defined: (i) EA → EB (Ef); (ii) EA → A (α); (iii) EB → B (β); and
(iv) A → B (f) (cf. Hughes, 2001: 7-8). The same commutative square holds
for the category of coalgebras, such that the latter are defined by inverting the
direction of the morphisms in both (ii) [A → EA (α)], and (iii) [B → EB (β)]
(op. cit.).5
The significance of the foregoing is twofold. First and foremost, the above
demonstrates how a formal correspondence can be effected between algebraic
models of cognition and coalgebraic models which provide a natural setting for
modal logics and automata. The second aspect of the philosophical significance
of modal colagebraic automata is that – as a model of modal expressivism –
the proposal is able to countenance fundamental properties in the foundations
of mathematics, and circumvent the issues accruing to the attempt so to do by
the competing expressivist approaches.
5Note that the theory for the model will be a topological coalgebra – cf. Takeuchi, 1985 for
further discussion – and that, unlike isomorphism, the property of being dually isomorphic is
not one-one (cf. Hughes, op. cit.: 13). Dual isomorphisms are thus more akin to bisimulations
(cf. Blackburn et al., 2001: 64-66).
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3 Discussion
3.1 Material Adequacy
The material adequacy of epistemic modal algebras as a fragment of the rep-
resentational theory of mind is witnessed by the prevalence of possible worlds
semantics – the model theory for which is algebraic (cf. Blackburn et al., 2001:
ch. 5) – in cognitive psychology, and the convergences thereof with theoretical
physics.
In Bayesian perceptual psychology, e.g., the visual system is presented with
a prior distribution of possibilities concerning the direction of a source of light.
The set of possibilities is pointed, as the visual system calculates the likelihood
that one of the possibilities is actual, and places a condition thereby on the
accuracy of the attribution of properties – such as boundedness and volume –
to distal particulars (cf. Mamassian et al., 2000).
In the philosophy of physics, modal notions play, further, an ineliminable
role in physical ontology and in the theoretical and observational characteri-
zations thereof. Transition functions in quantum information theory can, for
example, be interpreted counterfactually, in order to countenance the possible
transformations of systems, the inputs of which include the expectation values
of spin-state vectors (Deutsch, 2013). In the interpretation of physical theories,
Ruetsche (2011: 9) argues, further, that ’[T]o interpret a physical theory is to
characterize the worlds possible according to that theory’. She notes that the
interpretation of a physical theory falls into two phases, both of which constitu-
tively involve modal notions. The first phase consists in the specification of the
possible states of the models at issue; the possible values taken with regard to
the observable kinematics thereof, e.g., the expectation values of Hilbert oper-
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ators; and then the laws comprising the dynamic transformations therein (op.
cit.). The second phase targets the nomologically possible worlds in which the
properties of the first phase of interpretation are satisfied (op. cit.). In quantum
field theory, unital algebras are availed of, as well, where the algebras are closed
under commutativity and associativity; scalar multiplication by complex num-
bers, such that for all vectors A,B, and complex numbers cn: c1(A + B) = c1A
+ c1B; (c1 + c2)A = c1A + c2A; c1(c2A) = (c1c2)A; (c1A)B - A(c1B) = c1(AB);
and multiplicative identity, i.e., for an element I, AI = IA = A (74). Finally,
Belot (2011) argues that – in the dispute between relationalist and substantival-
ist conceptions of spatial geometry – a relationalist proposal can be proffered,
according to which – by analogy with nomological possibilities – the different
metric relations that can be grounded in the intrinsic points comprising spatial
regions are geometric possibilities.
Finally, in artificial intelligence, the subfield of knowledge representation
draws on epistemic logic, where possibility and necessity are interpreted as be-
lief and knowledge (Meyer and van der Hoeck, 1995; Fagin et al., 1995). Pos-
sibility and necessity may receive other interpretations in mental terms, such
as that of conceivability and apriority (i.e. truth in all epistemic possibilities,
or inconceivability that not φ). The Language of Thought hypothesis main-
tains that thinking occurs in a mental language with a computational syntax
and a semantics. The philosophical significance of cognitivism about epistemic
modality is that it construes epistemic intensions as abstract, computational
functions in the mind, and thus provides an explanation of the relation that
human beings bear to epistemic possibilities, rather than leaving questions of
the ground of epistemic possibilities unexplained. Cognitivism about epistemic
modality argues that thoughts are comprised of intensions, or functions from
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epistemic possibilities to extensions. Cognitivism about epistemic modality pro-
vides a metaphysical explanation or account of the ground of thoughts, arguing
that they are grounded in epistemic possibilities and intensions, which are them-
selves internal representations comprising the semantics for a mental language.
This is consistent with belief and knowledge being countenanced in an epis-
temic logic for artificial intelligence. Epistemic possibilities are constitutively
related thoughts, and figure furthermore in the analysis of notions such as apri-
ority and conceivability, as well as belief and knowledge in epistemic logic for
artificial intelligence.
In the the remainder of the paper, I outline an expressivist semantics for
epistemic modals. I endeavor, then, to demonstrate the advantages accruing to
the present approach to countenancing modal expressivism via modal colage-
braic automata, via a comparison of the theoretical strength of the proposal
when applied to characterizing the fundamental properties of the foundations of
mathematics, by contrast to the competing approaches to modal expressivism
and the limits of their applications thereto.
3.2 Expressivist Semantics for Epistemic Modals
Let expressivism about a domain of discourse be the claim that an utterance
from that domain expresses a mental state, rather than states a fact (Hawke
and Steinert-Threlkeld, 2020). Hawke and Steinert-Threlkeld (op. cit.) distin-
guish between semantic expressivism and pragmatic expressivism. Expressivism
about epistemic modality takes the property expressed by ⋄φ to be {s⊆ W : s
1 ¬p}, where s is a state of information, W is a set of possible worlds, and s 
φ if and only if φ is assertible relative to s, if and only if the state of informa-
tion is compatible with φ. Semantic expressivism incorporates a "psychologistic
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semantics" according to which the value of φ is a partial function from infor-
mation states to truth-values (op. cit.), such that "the mental type expressed
by φ is characterized in terms of the assertibility relation " and "the definition
of  is an essential part of that of J K" (op. cit.). Pragmatic expressivism re-
jects the psychologistic semantics condition, and "allows for a gap between the
compositional semantic theory and " (op. cit.).
Hawke and Steinert-Threlkeld (op. cit.) argue that satisfying the following
conditions is a desideratum of any expressivist account about epistemic possi-
bility:
(Weak) Wide-scope Free Choice (WFC):
⋄p ∨ ⋄¬p  ⋄p ∧ ⋄¬p
Disjunctive Inheritence (DIN):
(⋄p ∧ q) ∨ r  [⋄(p ∧ q) ∧ q] ∨ r
Disjunctive Syllogism and Schroeder’s Constraints:
DSF {⋄¬q, p ∨ q 1 p}
SCH {⋄¬p, p ∨ q 1 q}
DSF and SCH record the failure of disjunctive syllogism in the presence of
epistemic contradictions.
WFC is vindicated by the contention that when someone asserts p ∨ ¬p,
they neither believe p nor believe ¬p, and so are in a position to assert both ⋄p
and ⋄¬p.
DIN is vindicated by the equivalence of the content of the utterances, e.g.,
(1) Nataly is at home and might be watching a film.
(2) Nataly is at home and might be watching a film at home.
Hawke and Steinert-Threlkeld’s modal propositional assertibility semantics
is then as follows.
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Reading t ⊆ s: JφKt 6= 1 as "s refutes φ":
• if p is an atom: JpKs = 1 iff s ⊆ V(p)
if p is an atom JpKs = 0 iff s refutes p
• J¬φKs = 1 iff JφKs = 0
J¬φKs = 0 iff JφKs = 1
• Jφ ∧ ψKs = 1 iff JφKs = 1 and JψKs = 1
Jφ ∧ ψKs = 0 iff s refutes φ ∧ ψ
• Jφ ∨ ψKs = 1 iff there exists s1, s2 such that s = s1 ∪ s2, JφKs1 = 1 and
JψKs2 = 1
Jφ ∨ ψKs = 0 iff s refutes φ ∨ ψ
• J⋄φKs = 1 iff JφKs 6= 0
J⋄φKs = 0 iff s refutes ⋄φ
• φ := ¬⋄¬φ
Unlike Yalcin’s (2007) domain semantics, Veltman’s (1996) update seman-
tics, and Moss’ (2015, 2018) probabilistic semantic expressivism, Hawke and
Steinert-Threlkeld’s assertibility semantics satisfies WFC, DIN, DSF, and
SCH (op. cit.). As a preliminary, suppose
Proposition 1 If φ is ⋄-free, then s  ⋄φ holds iff there exists w∈s such that:
{w}  φ (op. cit.).
Proof: s  ⋄φ holds iff JφKs 6= 0. JφKs = 0 iff JφK{w} = 0 for every w∈s. So,
JφKs 6= 0 iff JφKw 6= 0 for some w∈s iff {w}  φ for some w∈s (op. cit.).
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For WFC, suppose that s  ⋄p ∨ ⋄¬p. So, there exists s1, s2 that cover s
and s1  ⋄p and s2  ⋄¬p. By Proposition 1, there exist u,v∈s such that {u}
 p and {v}  ¬p. Thus, s  ⋄p and s  ⋄¬p (op. cit.).
For DIN, suppose that s  (⋄p ∧ q) ∨ r. So, there exists s1, s2, such that
s = s1 ∪ s2 with s1  ⋄p, s1  q, and s2  r. For every w∈s1, {w}  q. There
also exists u∈s1 such that {u}  p. Hence, {u}  p ∧ q and – by Proposition 1
– s1  ⋄(p ∧ q). Thus s  [⋄(p ∧ q) ∧ q] ∨ r (op. cit.).
For DSF and SCH, suppose that there is an s such that every world in s is
either a p ∧ ¬q world or a ¬p ∧ q world. Suppose that there exists at least one
p ∧ ¬q world in s and at least one ¬p ∧ q world in s (op. cit.).
Relativists about epistemic modals either relativize content or relativize
truth to a context of assessment (Starr, 2012: 3; Egan and Weatherson, 2011:
11-14). According to content relativism, epistemic modals express different
propositions in different contexts of assessment (Starr, op. cit.). According
to truth relativism, epistemic modals express the same proposition, which is
true relative to some assessors and false relative to others, such that truth is
a three-place relation between a world, a judge, and a proposition, i.e. a cen-
tered world and a proposition (Starr, op. cit.: 3, 5). Thus, X believes that
stealing is wrong is an ascription of belief in a centered proposition, i.e. a de se
belief (Beddor, forthcoming: 9). As Yalcin (2011: 307) points out, utterances
with epistemic modals on the truth relativist proposal thus express second-order
states, i.e., de se beliefs (cf. Beddor, op. cit.).
That epistemic modal beliefs are second-order on the truth relativist pro-
posal adduces against the merits of the view. Yalcin (op. cit.: 308) argues
that non-human animals can entertain states expressed by epistemic modals,
and we here follow him in thinking that, by taking epistemic modal beliefs to
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be second-order de se ascriptions, the truth relativist proposal would preclude
young children and non-human animals from entertaining epistemic possibilities.
However, young children and non-human animals, while lacking the capacity
to entertain second-order states, nevertheless entertain epistemic possibilities.
The foregoing thus adduces in favor of the expressivist proposal that epistemic
modals express first-order states of mind.
3.3 Modal Expressivism and the Philosophy of Mathe-
matics
When modal expressivism is modeled via speech acts on a common ground
of presuppositions, the application thereof to the foundations of mathematics is
limited both (i) by the manner in which necessary propositions are characterized,
as well as (ii) by the metalinguistc – rather than, e.g., epistemic – interpretation
of the semantics.6
Because for example a proposition is taken, according to the proposal, to be
identical to a set of possible worlds, all necessarily true mathematical formulas
can only express a single proposition; namely, the set of all possible worlds (cf.
Stalnaker, 1978; 2003: 51). Thus, although distinct set-forming operations will
be codified by distinct axioms of a language of set theory, the axioms will be
assumed to express the same proposition: The axiom of Pairing in set theory
– which states that a unique set can be formed by combining an element from
6See Author (ms) for an application of the epistemic interpretation of multi-dimensional
intensional semantics to account for the modal profile of Orey sentences; i.e. mathematical
propositions that are undecidable relative to the axioms of a given language. (For the ori-
gins of multi-dimensional intensional semantics, see Kamp, 1967; Vlach, 1973; and Segerberg,
1973.) The distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibilities, as they pertain to
the values of mathematical formulas, is anticipated by Gödel’s (1951: 11-12) distinction be-
tween mathematics in its subjective and objective senses, where the former concerns decidable
formulas, and the latter records the values of formulas defined, owing to the incompleteness
theorems, in a variant of the language augmented by stronger axioms of infinity. Axioms of
infinity take the form, ’∃x∅∈x ∧ ∀u(u∈x → {u}∈x)’, and record closure on the singleton of a
real in the cumulative hierarchy of sets, where the real can be a large cardinal.
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each of two extant sets: ∃x∀u(u∈x ⇐⇒ u = a ∨ u = b) – will be supposed to
express the same proposition as the Power Set axiom – which states that a set
can be formed by taking the set of all subsets of an extant set: ∃x∀u(u∈x ⇐⇒
u⊆a). However, that distinct operations – i.e., the formation of a set by selecting
elements from two extant sets, by contrast to forming a set by collecting all of
the subsets of a single extant set – are characterized by the different axioms is
readily apparent.
Stalnaker endeavors to redress the objection by availing of the metaseman-
tic interpretation of multi-dimensional intensional semantics, according to which
the necessarily true propositions comprising the common ground are yet con-
sistent with contingently valued speech acts – e.g., assertions – about those
propositions (2003: 54). Although it does record a difference in the epistemic
status of agents with regard to whether they know or believe the propositions
at issue, the proposal is yet not itself sufficient to distinguish between the senses
of distinct, albeit necessarily true formulas.
Further, the metalinguistic interpretation of the semantics places a restric-
tion on the expressive capacity of the mathematical languages at issue. By
contrast to the objectual interpretation of the quantifiers, the metalinguistc in-
terpretation of multi-dimensional intensional semantics – by restricting itself
to the remit of natural language semantics – is limited to substitutional quan-
tification; i.e. to quantification over only those objects for which a name, in
the natural language, has been specified (op. cit.). Given, however, the above
restriction, substitutional quantification cannot account for impredicative com-
prehension; i.e., for the specification of extensions of terms, with reference to
the totality of items of the type that the terms are intended to designate.
By contrast to the limits of Stalnaker’s approach to modal expressivism,
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differences in the senses of formulas can, as noted, be recorded by the corre-
spondence, in modal algebras, between modal operators and intensional func-
tions, such that the senses of materially equivalent propositions-as-possibilities
can shift when the possibilities are translated as intensions and figure within
hyperintensional contexts. Further, both epistemic modal algebras and their
dually corresponding modal coalgebraic automata permit of unrestricted objec-
tual quantification, and are thus unconfined to the expressive limitations of the
substitutional quantifiers of natural language.
A variation of Stalnaker’s semantics is proffered in Yalcin (2016). Yalcin
(op. cit.) argues that concepts and beliefs can be modeled in the manner of
subject matters (cf. Lewis, 1998; Yablo, 2014), where the latter are interrogative
updates on a background set of epistemically possible worlds, and the inquiry
whether φ induces a focus on a subset of worlds which answer whether φ. In
the setting of philosophy of mathematics, however, it is unclear how identifying
subject matters with fragments of an epistemic modal space induced by inter-
rogative updates can model the nature of, inter alia, Orey sentences such as the
generalized continuum hypothesis (i.e., ℵα
ℵα = ℵα+1),
whose values are indeterminate relative to the present axioms of ZF set
theory with choice, and the reduction in the incompleteness of which depends
upon augmenting the relevant mathematical languages with stronger axioms of
infinity (cf. Woodin, 2010). In order to determine the truth-values of Orey sen-
tences, the space of epistemic modality might require an expanding domain by
way of which the new axioms and their corresponding theorems can be accom-
modated. It is thus unclear how a treatment of subject matters as an induced
restriction on the space of epistemic possibilities – i.e., as interrogative-induced
operations from a set of possibilities to any particular subset thereof – could
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begin to account for the required expansion in epistemic states.
Thomasson (2007) argues for a version of modal expressivism which she
refers to as ’modal normativism’, according to which alethic modalities are to
be replaced by deontic modalities taking the form of object-language, modal in-
dicative conditionals (op. cit.: 136, 138, 141). The modal indicative conditionals
serve to express constitutive rules pertaining, e.g., to ontological dependencies
which state that: ’Necessarily, if an entity satisfying a property exists then a
distinct entity satisfying a property exists’ (143-144), and generalizes to other
expressions, such as analytic conditionals which state, e.g., that: ’Necessarily,
if an entity satisfies a property, such as being a bachelor, then the entity sat-
isfies a distinct yet co-extensive property, such as being unmarried’ (148). A
virtue of Thomasson’s interpretation of modal indicative conditionals as ex-
pressing both analytic and ontological dependencies is that it would appear to
converge with the ’If-thenist’ proposal in the philosophy of mathematics. ’If-
thenism’ is an approach according to which, if an axiomatized mathematical
language is consistent, then (i) one can either bear epistemic attitudes, such
as fictive acceptance, toward the target system (cf. Leng, 2010: 180) or (ii)
the system (possibly) exists [cf. Russell (op. cit.: §1); Hilbert (1899/1980:
39); Menger (1930/1979: 57); Putnam (1967); Shapiro (2000: 95); Chihara
(2004: Ch. 10); and Awodey (2004: 60-61)].7 However, there are at least two
7See Leng (2009), for further discussion. Field (1980/2016: 11-21; 1989: 54-65, 240-
241) argues in favor of the stronger notion of conservativeness, according to which consistent
mathematical theories must be satisfiable by internally consistent theories of physics. More
generally, for a class of assertions, A, comprising a theory of fundamental physics, and a class of
sentences comprising a mathematical language, M, any sentences derivable from A+M ought to
be derivable from A alone. Another variation on the ’If-thenist’ proposal is witnessed in Field
(2001: 333-338), who argues that the existence of consistent forcing extensions of set-theoretic
ground models adduces in favor of there being a set-theoretic pluriverse, and thus entrains
indeterminacy in the truth-values of undecidable sentences. For a similar proposal, which
emphasizes the epistemic role of examining how instances of undecidable sentences obtain
and fail so to do relative to forcing extensions in the set-theoretic pluriverse, see Hamkins
(2012: §7).
20
issues for the modal normativist approach in the setting of the philosophy of
mathematics. One general issue for the proposal is that the treatment of quan-
tification remains unaddressed, given that there are translations from modal
operators, such as figure in modal indicatives, into existential and universal
quantifiers.8 A second issue for the normative indicative conditional approach
is that Thomasson’s normative modalities are unimodal. They are thus not
sufficiently fine-grained to capture distinctions such as Gödel’s (op. cit.) be-
tween mathematics in its subjective and objective senses.9 Further distinctions
between the types of mathematical modality can be delineated which permit
epistemic types of mathematical possibility to serve as a guide as to whether a
formula is metaphysically mathematically possible.10 The convergence between
epistemic and metaphysical mathematical modalities can be countenanced via a
multi-dimensional intensional semantics. Thus, by eschewing alethic modalities
for unimodal, normative indicatives, the normative modalities are unable to ac-
count for the relation between the alethic interpretation of modality and, e.g.,
logical mathematical modalities treated as consistency operators on languages
(cf. Field, 1989: 249-250, 257-260; Leng: 2007; 2010: 258), or for the conver-
gence between epistemic possibilities concerning decidability and their bearing
on the metaphysical modal status of undecidable sentences.
According, finally, to Brandom’s (op. cit.) modal expressivist approach,
8The formal correspondence between modalities and quantifiers is anticipated by Aristotle
(De Interpretatione, 9; De Caelo, I.12), who defines the metaphysical necessity of a proposition
as its being true at all times. For detailed discussion of Aristotle’s theory, see Waterlow
(1982). For a contemporary account of the multi-modal logic for metaphysical and temporal
modalities, see Dorr and Goodman (ms). For contemporary accounts of the correspondence
between modal operators and quantifiers see von Wright (1952/1957), where von Wright
anticipates Kripke’s (1963) relational semantics for modal logic; Montague (1960/1974: 75);
Lewis (1975/1998; 1981/1998); Kratzer (op. cit.; 1981/2012); and Kuhn (1980).
9See footnote 8.
10See Author (ms), for further discussion. A precedent is Reinhardt (1974: 199-200), who
proposes the use of imaginary sets, classes, and projections, as ’imaginary experiments’ (204),
in order to ascertain the consequences of accepting new axioms for ZF which might account
for the reduction of the incompleteness of Orey sentences. See Maddy (1988,b), for critical
discussion.
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terms are individuated by their rules of inference, where the rules are taken
to have a modal profile translatable into the counterfactual forms taken by
the transition functions of automata (cf. Brandom, 2008: 142). In order to
countenance the metasemantic truth-conditions for the object-level, pragmatic
abilities captured by the automata’s counterfactual transition states, Brandom
augments a first-order language comprised of a stock of atomic formulas with an
incompatibility function (141). An incompatibility function, I, is defined as the
incoherence of the union of two sentences, where incoherence is a generalization
of the notion of inconsistency to nonlogical vocabulary.
x ∪ y ∈ Inc ⇐⇒ x ∈ I(y) (141-142).
Incompatibility is supposed to be a modal notion, such that the union of
the two sentences is incompossible (126). A sentence, β is an incompatibility-
consequence, I , of a sentence, α, iff there is no sequence of sentences, <γ1, . . . ,
γn>, such that it can be the case that α I <γ1, . . . , γn>, yet not be the case
that β I <γ1, . . . , γn> (125). To be incompatible with a necessary formula
is to be compatible with everything that does not entail the formula (129-130).
Dually, to be incompatible with a possible formula is to be incompatible with
everything compatible with something compatible with the formula (op. cit.).
There are at least two, general issues for the application of Brandom’s modal
expressivism to the foundations of mathematics.
The first issue is that the mathematical vocabulary – e.g., the set-membership
relation, ∈ – is axiomatically defined. I.e., the membership relation is defined by,
inter alia, the Pairing and Power Set axioms of set-theoretic languages. Thus,
mathematical terms have their extensions individuated by the axioms of the
language, rather than via a set of inference rules that can be specified in the
absence of the mention of truth values. Even, furthermore, if one were to avail
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of modal notions in order to countenance the intensions of the mathematical
vocabulary at issue – i.e., functions from terms in intensional contexts to their
extensions – the modal profile of the intensions is orthogonal to the properties
encoded by the incompatibility function. Fine (2006) avails, e.g., of a dynamic
logic in order to countenance the possibility of reinterpreting the intensions
at issue, and of thus accounting for variance in the range of the domains of
quantifier expressions. The dynamic possibilities are specified as operational
conditions on tracking increases in the size of the cardinality of the universe
(Fine, 2005). Uzquiano (2015b) argues that it is always possible to reinterpret
the intensions of non-logical vocabulary, as one augments one’s language with
stronger axioms of infinity and climbs thereby farther up the cumulative hierar-
chy of sets. The reinterpretations of, e.g., the concept of set are effected by the
addition of new large cardinal axioms, which stipulate the existence of larger
inaccessible cardinals. However, it is unclear how the incompatibility function –
i.e., a modal operator defined via Boolean negation and a generalized condition
on inconsistency – might similarly be able to model the intensions pertaining to
the ontological expansion of the cumulative hierarchy.
The second issue is that the truth-conditional formulas in the metalanguage
of Brandom’s modal expressivist semantics are not compositional. I.e., it is
not the case of the clauses in the metalanguage that their truth-conditions are
formed by the composition of the semantic values of their component expres-
sions. While the formulas are recursively formed – because the decomposition
of complex formulas into atomic formulas is decidable although computationally
infeasible – formulas in the language are not compositional, because they fail to
satisfy the subformula property to the effect that the value of a logically com-
plex formula is calculated as a function of the values of the component logical
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connectives applied to subformulas therein (135).11
By contrast to the limits of Brandom’s approach to modal expressivism,
modal coalgebraic automata can circumvent both of the issues mentioned in the
foregoing. In response to the first issue, concerning the axiomatic individuation
and intensional profiles of mathematical terms, functors of modal coalgebraic
automata can be interpreted in order to provide a precise delineation of the
intensions of the target vocabulary [cf. Author (ms). In response, finally, to the
second of the above issues, the values taken by modal coalgebraic automata are
both decidable and computationally feasible, while the dual isomorphism of co-
lagebras to Boolean-valued models of modal algebras ensures that the formulas
therein retain their compositionality. The decidability of colagebraic automata
can further be witnessed by the role of modal coalgebras in countenancing the
modal profile of Ω-logical consequence, where – given a proper class of Woodin
cardinals – the values of mathematical formulas can remain invariant through-
out extensions of the ground models comprising the set-theoretic pluriverse (cf.
Woodin, 2010; Author, ms). The individuation of large cardinals can further be
characterized by the functors of modal coalgebraic automata, when the latter
are interpreted so as to countenance the elementary embeddings constitutive of
large cardinal axioms in the category of sets.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this essay, I have endeavored to account for a mathematically tractable back-
ground against which to model both modal cognitivism and modal expressivism.
I availed, to that end, of the dual isomorphism between epistemic modal alge-
11Let a decision problem be a propositional function which is feasibly decidable, if it is a
member of the polynomial time complexity class; i.e., if it can be calculated as a polynomial
function of the size of the formula’s input (cf. Dean, 2015).
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bras and modal coalgebraic automata. Epistemic modal algebras were shown to
comprise a materially adequate fragment of the language of thought, given that
models thereof figure in both the cognitive, as well as in the interpretations
of the physical, sciences. It was then shown how the approach to modal ex-
pressivism here proffered, as regimented by the modal coalgebraic automata to
which the epistemic modal algebras aren dually isomorphic, avoids the pitfalls
attending to the competing modal expressivist approaches based upon both the
inferentialist approach to concept-individuation and the approach to codifying
the speech acts in natural language via intensional semantics. The present modal
expressivist approach was shown, e.g., to avoid the limits of the foregoing in the
philosophy of language, as they concerned the status of necessary propositions;
substitutional quantification; the inapplicability of inferentialist-individuation
to mathematical vocabulary; and failures of compositionality. Countenancing
modal expressivism via modal coalgebraic automata was shown, then, to be able
to account for both the intensions of mathematical terms and possible reinter-
pretations thereof; for the modal profile of Ω-logical consequence in the category
of sets; and for the elementary embeddings constitutive of large cardinal axioms
in set-theoretic languages.
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